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Abstract 
In both popular and academic imagination, Islamization and globalization are the 
opposing processes, representing ”the clash of civilizations” (Huntington, 
1993,1996).  In Southeast Asia, specifically, globalization is imagined as something 
distinctly Western and, hence, inherently at odds with Islam, while Islam, 
meanwhile, is seen as the natural enemy of globalization.  This paper instead sees 
Muslims as active participants in globalization.  Further, it explores the concept of 
“Muslim globalization” to suggest that Islam has long been a globalizing force 
alongside Western-based capitalism and other forces.  It explores this general 
model by using examples primarily from Southeast Asia. 
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Introduction 
 
Although academic discourse does not entirely ignore the place of Muslims in 
globalization (Roy, 2004, Lukens-Bull, 2000; 2005, Samad, 2008; Moghadam, 2008), popular 
discourse in both the West and (in our opinion, more importantly ), in Southeast Asia tends to 
depict globalization as a process that happens to Muslims. In discussing the cultural impacts of 
the World Capitalist System on local cultures, “Westernization” typically refers to a particular 
kind of culture change that follows an imagined model of Western life. Westernization is often 
conflated with modernization, as Daniel Pipes does when he says, “…modernization requires 
Westernization...” (1983, p. 197). This conflation also happens in Indonesian Islamic discourse.  
There are those who believe that modernization can only occur by imitating Western, 
particularly American, cultural practices. In short, some Indonesians, and even some Muslims, 
seem to agree with Pipes.   
To understand the processes of globalization as applied to Islam, Arjun Appadurai’s 
(1996) concept of the five landscapes of globalization—(1) ethnoscapes, (2) mediascapes, (3) 
technoscapes, (4) finanscapes, and (5) ideoscapes—provides a useful framework because each 
landscape is caused by a different kind of movement: Ethnoscapes are caused by the movement 
of people, whereas mediascapes are caused by the flow of images and other media;  
technoscapes are created by the movement and sharing of technology, and finanscapes reflect 
the movement of finances that tie us into a single global economy. Finally, ideoscapes reflect 
the movement of ideas and ideologies. Appadurai’s focus on five landscapes is a useful 
corrective to views of globalization that overemphasize only one or two dimensions. Indeed, all 
five kinds of culture flows exist not only within the Western world but also quite clearly in the 
“Muslim world.” This paper will explicitly examine Muslim examples of each of these five 
landscapes in order to illustrate that Islamization is not a response to globalization but a part of 
it. Further, this paper will argue that while it is true that Western-tinted globalization has 
historical roots in empire building, the same is true of Muslim globalization. Finally, this paper 
will argue that while Western globalization and Muslim globalization seem to be opposing 
processes, they are in fact intricately intertwined and enmeshed. 
 
Conceptualizing Globalization 
 
  Elsewhere, Lukens-Bull defines “globalization” as a cover term for the processes by 
which the World Capitalist System becomes articulated with local systems, and as such, 
globalization may affect technology, economics, politics, culture, and religion. He argues that 
modernization and Westernization are part and parcel of globalization. Because these processes 
are integrated, it is common for globalization to seem to be Western in origin (Lukens-Bull, 
2000). For Anthony Giddens (1990), globalization is first and foremost economic and only 
secondarily involves politics (aspects of which are part of Appadurai’s ideoscapes), migration 
(ethnoscapes), and the dissemination of images (imagoscapes). Giddens sees the primary 
institutions of late capitalism (the world capitalist economy, the nation-state system, and the 
international division of labor) as the primary drivers of globalization. Given this, it is easy to 
see why globalization is imagined as growing out of the West, as these institutions are still 
largely dominated by Western nations. Popular discourse in Southeast Asia also sees 
globalization as Western in origin for many of the same reasons. Islamization as Part of Globalization: Some Southeast Asian Examples 
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  The work of many scholars illustrates this perception of globalization as deriving from 
Western practices. Benjamin Barber’s Jihad vs. McWorld (1995) describes globalization as a 
cultural steam roller that converts the world into a global paved parking lot full of McDonald's, 
Hard Rock Cafes, and MTV-pumping discos.  He focuses exclusively on the West as the source 
of globalization. For Barber, it is Western (pop) culture that is being globalized. The only 
alternatives discussed by Barber are violent attempts to assert local identity.  Barber's argument 
is interesting in regard to the Clash of Civilizations debate. Barber does not deal with either 
Bernard Lewis (who coined "Clash of Civilizations") or Huntington (who popularized it). 
Despite this, we find in Barber’s work the important corrective that the “clash” is not limited to 
the perceived efforts of Muslims to “resist” globalization but includes all efforts to oppose 
global capitalism (by any party) by emphasizing local identity.   
Even though Barber’s and others’ focus on the West is understandable, it remains 
mistaken. While such mistaken views of globalization do remain appropriately broad and 
clearly indicate the utility of applying Appadurai’s schema, problematically, in such Western-
centric views of globalization, Muslims are placed in a reactive relationship to the process.  
Elsewhere, Lukens-Bull has discussed the development of an Islamic modernity (Lukens-Bull, 
2001, 2005), in which Muslims actively conceptualize modernity in such a way that it can be 
perceived as Islamic. In some ways, Islamic globalization does not require such reimaginings; 
Muslim have been long part of a globalization merely by virtue of participating in trade 
relationship, building empires, and spreading their faith. In short, globalization is not new, nor 
is it dependent upon the movement of Western practices, and such misperceptions must be 
corrected. 
The Habermasian view of modernity argues that globalization is a product of the 
juxtaposition of three events—the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the discovery of the New 
World (Miller, 1994, p. 61)—all of which co-occurred during the beginning of what 
Wallerstein (1974) calls the World Capitalist System. Hence, modernization and 
Westernization are elements of globalization, not separate processes. The Western-based 
globalization that gets most of the attention has its roots in the colonial and imperialist 
expansion of European powers. The “othering” of Islam originates in colonialism; as political, 
economic, and religious “competitors,” Muslims were seen as quintessentially threatening to 
colonial Europeans (Fernea & Malarkey, 1975, p. 184-185; Said, 1978. p. 59-60). Lukens-Bull 
(2000b) examines the specific ways in which colonial scholarship in Southeast Asia shaped the 
way Islam in the region was understood into the late 20
th century. Said states that Islam became 
a symbol of terror, devastation, and all that was hated by Europe (1978, p. 59-60). This view of 
Islam served to legitimize colonial policies (Hussain, et al., 1984, p. 1). 
Colonialism was the embryonic form of modern globalization. The Europeans tied 
together different economies through their conquest and rule of non-European cultures. Crops 
that were unique to different parts of the world (like corn) became so well-integrated into 
different economies that, for example, most Madurese are incredulous that their staple dish of 
mixed rice and corn is a relatively recent development (within the last few hundred years) in 
their diet. Other foods reflect this sort of historical globalization in their very names: The fact 
that a major strain of coffee is called Arabica and that the North American English slang for 
coffee is Java reflects the movement of that crop from the Old World to the New World. 
  Further, globalizing Islam is also not new (Roy, 2004, p. 29). It is simply part of an 
ongoing historical process. In fact, Islam is one of two globalizing religions (the other being 
Christianity). Christianity and Islam differ from other world religions in that their missionary Journal of International and Global Studies 
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zeal is driven by the conviction that their message is meant for all of humanity and not just for a 
“chosen people.” Further, orthodox positions in both religions hold that their respective faiths 
are the only path to salvation, so there is an imperative to “invite” as much of humanity as 
possible to paradise by conversting. Not surprisingly, missionizing efforts within both religions 
are common, and these two religions have expanded further and deeper than any other faith. In 
a little over seven centuries, Islam has expanded beyond the Arabian Peninsula to the rest of the 
Middle East as well as Africa, Europe, and Asia. Indeed, missionaries and merchants were more 
responsible for this expansion than were migrants. Missionization is globalization with a 
specific religious intent. 
 
Muslim Globalization: Theoretical Significance 
 
In addition to refining our conception of globalization, the concept of Muslim 
globalization contributes to our understanding of Islam as well. It is critical to consider what 
ties the “Muslim world” together: What connects Sumatran (or Javanese or Malian) villagers 
with Rumi and his dervishes as well as with the Royal Saudi family, the Nation of Islam, and 
even Al-Qaeda?  We must consider not only what ties them together but also what distinguishes 
them from each other. As Roy asserts:  
The notion of a single ‘Muslim culture’ cannot survive analysis.  If it refers to 
Islam as a religion, it is redundant. The different Muslim populations have some 
element in common such and diet and holidays, which are nothing more than the 
basic tenets of the rituals and beliefs, but in themselves they do not constitute a 
culture. What is beyond the strict tenets of religious rituals and beliefs refers to 
specific national ethnic cultures, of which Islam is just a component, even it is 
indistinguishable. (Roy, 2004, p. 129). 
Therefore, it is critical to consider the relationships of Universal Islam, local islams, and 
received Islam.   
  Obviously there is some basic set of shared symbols, beliefs, and rituals that are found 
in the Qur’an and Hadith. These form the foundations of “Universal Islam.” Most discussions 
about Islamic texts and their relationship to local islams seems to suggest a unified position of 
the texts vis-a-vis popular practice. However, as Messick points out, Islamic texts are polyvocal 
(1988:637). Even with these “universal” foundations of Islam we find considerable debate and 
disagreement. Not all Hadith are accepted as sound and even if there is little room for debate on 
the soundness of Qur’anic verses, there is considerable debate on how to best interpret many 
passages. Lesser texts, such as works of tafsir (interpretation) are much more prone to sharp 
disagreement on a range of theological and legal questions.   
  “Received Islam” refers to the Islam that is taught to a particular community. A 
poignant example of the impact of received Islam is the traditional Javanese practice of female 
circumcision, in which instead of cutting the girl a ginger root is cut. Although most would 
argue that the Qur’an neither requires nor recommends female circumcisions, it is not 
uncommon in the Muslim world. The traditional Javanese version is truly illustrative of 
received Islam. When a Javanese girl begins menarche, the women in her family teach her how 
to take care of herself during her monthly cycle. They then symbolically circumcise her by 
placing a piece of ginger root over her genitals and cutting the root. While it is impossible to 
reconstruct the process that yielded this practice, two things had to take place (Feillard & 
Marcoes, 1998). First, someone had to teach the Javanese that female circumcision was a Islamization as Part of Globalization: Some Southeast Asian Examples 
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requirement of Islam. Second, the Javanese had to decide that they did not want to physically 
cut their girls.  The actual reasons are lost to history. However, the Javanese practice bilateral 
descent (as opposed to the patrilineal descent practiced by the Arabs and of the cultures in 
which FGM is more common). In general, societies with bilateral descent have greater gender 
parity than patrilineal societies.  In this way, local Islam entered the process. Since 
substitutional sacrifice (e.g. the ram for Ishmael) is a foundational myth
1 in Islam, substituting 
ginger root for the girls’ flesh is not inconsistent with Islam. 
  In another Javanese practice, the interaction of local concerns with received and 
universal Islam is even more clearly illustrated. The Javanese concept of closest kin does not 
align with the Islamic concept of closest kin (muhrim). In both systems, one cannot marry 
closest kin; however, due to the differences between the Javanese and Islamic concepts of 
closest kin, Islam permits marriages with of some types of cousins that the Javanese would 
consider incestuous. This is a serious matter, not least because of the implications for women of 
interacting with muhrim and non-muhrim men. Since Javanese culture includes a wider range of 
family members within the classification of muhrim than does Islamic culture (by including 
cousins among muhrim that Islam does not.), questions of marriageability (i.e. Islam allows the 
marriage of kinds of cousins the Javanese would find incestuous), ritual purification, and 
modesty.  Islam dictates that (1) the touch of non-muhrim member of the opposite sex 
invalidates wudhu (ritual purity)—the thinking being that since relations with muhrim would be 
incestuous, there is no need to safeguard against sexual desire and the impurity it brings—and 
(2) that women should wear hijab in front of men who are not muhrim, both of which 
complicate matters of who, exactly, a woman can and cannot be in contact with. To resolve this 
potential conflict between Javanese and Islamic interpretations of muhrim, pious grandmothers, 
including the grandmother of Abdurrahman Wahid,
2 found a way to solve this conundrum.  
Hadith traditions are clear that children who suckle at the same breast are to be considered 
siblings and cannot marry. By suckling all their grandchildren, these women aligned the Islamic 
definition of close kin with the Javanese one, making muhrim of the all.   
  In addition to the process of local populations interacting with the universal dimension 
of the Islamic texts and symbol systems, there is also considerable interaction between local 
islams. Indonesians interact with Egyptians through studies in Cairo, and in this way, the local 
experience of Egypt becomes part of the Indonesian discourse about Islam. Likewise, reading 
and discussing the writings of such authors as Fazlur Rahman, Hasan Hanafi, and even Sayyid 
Qutb draw Indonesians into discourses that originated elsewhere. 
These examples illustrate clear forms of Muslim globalism; despite its existence, 
however, Muslim globalism is not as often imagined in the West.  Indeed, even the 
identification of Muslims by Westerners is often fraught with misperception. Olivier Roy 
argues that Islam is far too often conflated with Arabs, as evidenced by the fact that discussions 
about Muslim encounters with globalization focus on the Arab Middle East, not with Malaysia 
or Turkey. (This shows the extent of Western ignorance about Muslims, especially since 60% 
of Muslims are from South and Southeast Asia).   Bernard Lewis’s What Went Wrong? (2001) 
and similar books are ostensibly written to deal with issues in Islam, yet they focus entirely on 
the Middle East (Roy, 2004, p.12). This exclusion of the rest of the world’s population of 
Muslims causes a misrepresentation of Islam as a whole.
3 Muslim globalization extends beyond 
the narrow view of the Middle East, so any attempts to explain global Islam while focusing 
entirely on the Arab Middle East will never fully encompass the true portrait of Islam in the 
global context.  Journal of International and Global Studies 
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Olivier Roy coined the term “global Muslim” but defined the term narrowly and 
restricted the term to Muslims who had migrated to the West (and other non-Muslim countries).  
For these Muslims, Roy argues there is a need to “stress their belonging to a universal ummah, 
whether in a purely quietist way or though political action” (Roy, 2004, p. ix). Roy argues that 
in the context of diaspora, Muslims must seek a way to reunite the ummah and “delink Islam 
from any given culture in favor of a transnational and universal set of specific patterns (beliefs, 
rituals, diet, prescriptions and so on)” (Roy, 2004, p. 120). 
 
Ethnoscapes 
 
  Roy’s concept of global Islam is too dependent on the Muslim diaspora.  To be sure, the 
diaspora is a significant component of Muslim globalization, but the movement of people is 
only one of the five movements that are part of globalization.  Further, it should be remembered 
that Appadurai’s five landscapes are not independent and that each of the movements influence 
the other.  For example, the movement of certain technologies like print, cassette tapes, and 
most recently, the internet facilitate the movement of both media and ideas.  Also the transfer of 
transportation technology increases the moment of people. 
  In Appadurai’s model, the movement of people creates ethnoscapes. In the 
contemporary world, this is often thought of in terms of migration and travel. When an 
Indonesian scholar pursues a graduate degree in Australia, the United States, or even Iran, the 
movement of that individual creates relationships and connections across the globe. The 
interactions that the Indonesian scholar has with fellow students and professors contribute to a 
global perspective for all involved. When more permanent migration occurs, it creates within 
the new nation a population that has concerns outside that country.   
  In Islamic globalization, in addition to the historical movement of merchants and 
missionaries, warriors, and kings, there is also the movement of pilgrims (Roy, 2004, p.109).   
The hajj has long reflected a movement of people central to Islamic globalization.  It brings 
Muslims from all over the world to a single place. For example, this global aspect of the hajj 
compelled Malcolm X to abandon his anti-white racism; seeing Muslims of varied skin tones 
worship together did not fit with the Nation of Islam teaching that whites were devils (X with 
Haley, 1965). Historically, the hajj has had even a stronger global impact. Not only does the 
modern hajj include much larger numbers of pilgrims, whose trips are facilitated by air travel, it 
also allows for journeys of only a few weeks (as opposed to years).  In the age of sail and land 
travel, it was common for a haji to spend a number of years in Mecca studying.   
In the 19th century, the heads of many Sufi orders were Southeast Asians (Snouck 
Hurgronje, 1931, p. 276-9; Dhofier, 1982, p. 89). This created global networks of scholars.  
Roy argues that this “community of the learned” existed across linguistic and ethnic divides.   
Not only did this network of scholars use a common language (Arabic), the schools in which 
they studied and taught were remarkably comparable. However, pre-modern globalization, 
whether Muslim or Western (where a similar “community of the learned” existed), was 
confined to the intellectual elite.  However, contemporary globalization is more of mass 
phenomenon (Roy, 2004, p. 109).  In the modern era, for example, an impressive global 
network of Muslims was created through the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. Even the terror 
network today associated with Al-Qaeda was a global network, born in Afghanistan. Young 
men from all over the world were able to meet, form bonds, and create global networks. Roy 
avers that support of the Mujahiddin by the Saudis was an attempt to redefine fundamentalism Islamization as Part of Globalization: Some Southeast Asian Examples 
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more along the lines of the Wahhabi pattern instead of the heretofore dominant Iranian model 
(2004: 291).    
  One consequence of Muslim migration has to do with citizenship and 
statelessness.  When it comes to legality, citizenship is defined more by ethnic origin than by 
the practice of Islam, since it is possible for anyone to convert to Islam at any time.  For this 
reason, Muslim migrants may become stateless persons due to their movement. Kuwait 
effectively demonstrates the potential for statelessness due to its exclusionary politics for 
immigration. Kuwaiti immigration policy exists as a defense mechanism with the goal of 
protecting the status of Kuwaiti natives since ". . . the larger the presence of non-Kuwaiti 
migrants, the more threatened the position of the Kuwaitis . . ." (1997, p. 7).   In fact, the main 
delineator of legal citizenship, the Nationality Law of 1959, is consistently revised to be more 
and more exclusionary in order to protect existing social structures (1997, p. 48). As Roy 
writes, "A child born in Kuwait to a Palestinian father and a Kuwaiti mother has no citizenship" 
(2004, p. 105).  Muslim statelessness thus has less to do with practicing Islam and more to do 
with the vested social interests and complex political practices in the areas to which Muslims 
have migrated.  
Temporary migration for the purpose of education is also part of this process. For 
example, Al Azhar University, the oldest Islamic educational institution, is a hub for Muslims 
to participate in the globalization of Islam. Because Al Azhar’s student base draws upon 
Muslims from around the world, there is a melding of various ideologies from differing cultural 
contexts, which allows for the creation of new discourses. For instance, Indonesian students 
studying at Al Azhar participate in creating a global Islamic identity, as they bring to the school 
the Indonesian discourse about Islam. Additionally, the local Egyptian experience becomes part 
of their perspective of Islam. This is brought back to the Indonesian context when they finish 
their studies.  Indonesian Muslims also imagine a global community of Muslims, and based on 
that image engage with Islamic humanitarian groups. Such migration is responsible for the 
existence of many international partnerships. For instance, the International Islamic Council for 
Da'wah and Relief is based out of Cairo, Egypt, yet works with over one hundred different 
Islamic Aid groups across international borders, including Morocco, Indonesia, Sudan, and 
many others.  
 
Technoscapes 
 
  Some modernization theorists define modernization as the scientific technology to daily 
practices (Ward & Rustow, 1964; Inkeles & Smith, 1974). This definition seems to have stuck; 
often in Indonesian discourse, “modern” means little more than the use of technology. The 
Indonesian Islamic community has freely borrowed scientific technology including 
automobiles, airplanes, and even loud speakers for sermons. Some scholars suggest that the use 
and reproduction of scientific technology leads to the rationalization of other aspects of society, 
including economics, political organization, family, culture, and religion (Waardenberg 
1996:317). In other words, the use of scientific technology necessarily changes a culture. This 
hypothesis has been an important component for both Islamic discourse and Western 
scholarship about it and is best expressed by Daniel Pipes:     
To escape anomy (sic), Muslims have but one choice, for modernization requires 
Westernization . . . . Islam does not offer an alternative way to modernize . . . . 
Secularism cannot be avoided.  Modern science and technology require an Journal of International and Global Studies 
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absorption of the thought processes which accompany them; so too, with political 
institutions. Because content must be emulated no less than form, the 
predominance of Western civilization must be acknowledged so as to be able to 
learn from it. European language and Western educational institutions cannot be 
avoided, even if the latter do encourage freethinking and easy living. Only when 
Muslims explicitly accept the Western model will they be in a position to 
technicalize and then to develop. (1983, p. 197-198) 
While Pipes’ cultural chauvinism is extraordinary, he does raise an important question:  
Can Muslims adopt the technology of the West and still hold fast to the teachings of the 
Prophet?  Or are the values of the West (and Westernization itself) inseparable from Western 
technology (and modernization)?  In short, does technology necessarily change culture, and 
does it necessarily change it in a certain direction? These questions may not have definitive 
answers, nor may there be uniquely Muslim technoscapes, but technoscapes are interesting 
aspects of Muslim dimension of globalization, nonetheless. The introduction of faster ships, and 
later planes, have facilitated the hajj and made for more and more pilgrims. Likewise, cassette 
tapes, DVDs, CDs, PA systems, computers, and cell phones are technologies from the West that 
have facilitated the movement of ideas in the global Islamic context. Even digital technologies 
have helped create new ways to interact in Islam across national contexts. Eickelman and 
Anderson state:  
What is happening with Islam on the Internet is a forging of at least three sets of 
related links. One set links individual Muslims via the medium of the Internet . . . 
in social networks of communication . . . . What emerges with the Internet is thus 
a sphere of intermediate people, new interpreters, drawn from these realms, and 
linking them in a new social, public space of alternative voices and authorities 
(Eickelman & Anderson, 2003, p. 56). 
A prime example of this is social networking websites such as Facebook, which speed the rate 
at which social connections can be made. For example, when the first author posted to his 
Facebook account that he was going to Cairo and wanted to meet with Indonesian students at 
Al-Azhar, it took less than 12 hours for the introductions to be made. The internet has become 
particularly important in Arab countries because traditional broadcast media remain under 
direct government supervision (and sometimes but not always government owned) (Hafez, 
2001, p. 29) 
 
Financescapes 
 
Financescapes, or the movement of wealth, were primary driving forces for European 
colonialism. The movement of crops and other trade goods created a global economy that in 
time transcended specific political empires. However, if we consider history carefully, we will 
see that Islamic globalization was already at work at the time of European colonialism and was 
even a catalyst for Western globalization. We must ask, why it was, in 1492, that Isabella and 
Ferndinand, fresh from a war of reconquest, funded a seemingly crackpot explorer who wanted 
to find a Western route to India and China. The answer is rather simple: Because Europeans 
knew of these lands and knew of their rich trade goods, they explicitly wanted to find another 
route to Asia. The route they knew, the Silk Road (from Istanbul to India through the Malay 
Archipelago and on to China) was controlled by a well-developed trade network of Islamic 
states.  (In fact, the history of Southeast Asian conversion to Islam is the story of kings Islamization as Part of Globalization: Some Southeast Asian Examples 
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choosing to create political and economic alliances with Muslims.
4 For example the king of 
Malacca found that conversion to Islam gave him powerful allies in his competition with 
Buddhist Siam to the north and Hindu Majapahit to the south (Lukens-Bull, 2006, p. 391-392).  
This created a “world economic system,” which is an interconnected set of local economies not 
tied by empire or political rule.) In any event, European powers wanted access to the trade 
goods of India and China without necessarily having to go through the Muslim-controlled 
Eastern route.  Spain, in particular, having just either forcibly converted or expelled Muslims, 
was most interested in circumventing trade relationships with the Muslim economic network.  
The resulting expansion of the West created an alternative economic network which came to 
dominate the global economy. Western dominance in the global economy must not be 
interpreted to mean that Muslim economic networks completely disappeared, however. Today, 
OPEC is one example of a Muslim economic network; nine of the twelve member nations of 
OPEC are Muslim.  The presence of a minority of non-Muslims nations does not significantly 
diminish the fact that major Muslim powers are joined in economic cooperation. 
Contemporary aspects of financescapes include multi-national Shariah banks as well as 
financial contributions from wealthy Muslim states like Saudi Arabia and Iran to developing 
Muslim countries. For example, Iran has a scholarship program for Indonesian students 
pursuing their educations in Iran that each year brings about 700 Indonesian high school and 
college graduates to Iran to pursue their education as far as they would like, up through a Ph.D.  
Saudi Arabia also funds madrasas and colleges in Indonesia.  Both of these trends have obvious 
feedback to ideoscapes. There are Saudi funded universities in Indonesia as well as mosques.  
Zachary Abuza (2003) even explores the financial networks of terror organizations and traces 
the flow of funds from Al-Qaeda to Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia.  
Because of the specific requirements for banking under Sharia, there is a particular 
Muslim form of financescapes. Sharia law seeks to prevent unethical economic activity by 
incorporating the rules and beliefs of the Muslim religion involving ethics, morality, and 
behavior in banking (DiVanna, 2006, p. 3; Abdul-Rahman, 2010, p. 64). Sharia banks typically 
must have a Sharia board governing the bank (DiVanna, 2006, p. 5). Such banks are becoming 
increasingly influential. Southeast Asia is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, 
and Islamic banks have been showing increasing interest and establishing institutions, 
especially in Afghanistan and India, and there are already banks established in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. In short, Islamic banking in Southeast Asia presents great promise for rapid 
globalization of Sharia ethics in banks (Khan & Bhatti, 2008, p. 716). Sometimes the spread of 
Sharia banking has a “missionary” feel to it. For example, the Saudi royal family has fronted 
Sharia banks in Sudan (Khan and Bhatti, 2008:720).  In Indonesia, Sharia banking came, in 
part, from the pressure of organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama which did not wish to require it to 
be required but for Muslims to have that option (cf. Lukens-Bull, 2005:34-36, Hefner, 1996). 
Again, since missionizing is a globalizing force, the missionary spread of Sharia banking 
demonstrates some of the mechanisms of Islamic globalization. 
Migration has also lead to the spread of Islamic banking. In 2002, interest began to be 
shown in Sharia banking in the UK due to the 1.8 million Muslims living there, and in 2004, the 
first Sharia-approved bank in the UK, the Islamic Bank of Britain, was established. To allow 
this, Britain had to change its banking laws through the Financial Services Authority, among 
other agencies (DiVanna, 2006, p. 71-72). In Australia, Islamic banking is gradually increasing 
its number of institutions. The Muslim Community Cooperative Australia has been creating 
financial opportunities, including banking, investments, and real estate, since 1989 and Journal of International and Global Studies 
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currently has over 8,000 customers. Even the National Australia Bank is incorporating Islamic 
sectors in its institution. (Khan & Bhatti, 2008, p. 721). Likewise, in North America, where 
there are estimated to be over 10 million Muslims, there are many Islamic financial industries 
that have integrated the Sharia Laws. Many of these engage in establishing and financing funds, 
autos, business, real estate, home mortgages, establishing funds, and medical clinics (Khan & 
Bhatti, 2008, p. 722). Not only has Islamic banking and financing been spreading worldwide, 
but many Western financing ideas have been integrated in to the Islamic sphere, providing yet 
another example of the two-way influence of the Western and Islamic communities on each 
other. In recent years, Islamic security firms, insurance companies, and financial service 
providers are entering the marketplace (DiVanna, 2006. p. 6). 
 
Ideoscapes 
 
  It almost seems unnecessary to state that Muslim globalization involves the movement 
of ideas, beliefs, and values. On one level, it means little more than saying that Islam moved out 
of the Arabian Peninsula. The peaceful spread of Islam to Southeast Asia is a clearer example 
of the global movement of ideas. Conversion did not mark the end of the global movement of 
ideas among Muslims but rather the beginning. The fact that the works of Muslim intellectuals 
are translated out of their native languages into other Muslim vernaculars is part of the ongoing 
movement of ideas.  
Roy’s (2004) work on global Islam fails to acknowledge the fact that most Muslims do 
not live in diaspora and yet are still a part of globalization and global Islam. His work does not 
give us much sense of how Muslims in Indonesia, or Morocco, or Mali, or any Muslim-
majority country for that matter, engage global Islam. In contemporary Southeast Asia, 
traditional Islamic schools called pesantren are restructuring their curricula to engage in global 
processes. This includes adopting a government-recognized curriculum that includes globally 
recognized subjects such as math, biology, and chemistry. Starting in the 1970s, these new 
curricula became an important part of the pesantren community’s strategy for negotiating 
modernity. These changes have shaped both daily life as well as a general sense of what kind of 
education a pesantren should provide.  It is common for parents to seek schools that give their 
children the necessary skills and knowledge to do well in the modern job market as well as the 
moral and religious training to be good Muslims and upstanding citizens. Contemporary 
pesantren at this level aspire to deliver both the pre-20
th century pesantren curriculum and the 
newer government curriculum with the hope of graduating alumni who have the religious 
knowledge and morality of a religious leader as well as the basic education needed to pursue 
further education at the college level (Lukens-Bull, 2000, 2005). 
  Some have argued that the globalization of Islamic thought coming out of the Middle 
East is “Wahhabi colonialism.” Roy argues that the long struggle of “true fundamentalists (the 
Wahhabis, for instance)” to separate local ethnic culture from Islam is an effort to make Islam a 
truly global religion that is the same everywhere. He argues: 
Fundamentalism is both a product and an agent of [globalization] because it 
acknowledges without nostalgia the loss of pristine cultures and sees as positive 
the opportunity to build a universal religious identity, delinked form any specific 
culture, including the Western one perceived as corrupt and decadent—a constant 
topic of fundamentalist literature.  But maybe this last twist is the real victory of 
[Westernization] (2004, p. 25) Islamization as Part of Globalization: Some Southeast Asian Examples 
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Indeed, Olivier Roy suggests that the ummah of the neo-fundamentalist is imagined “beyond 
ethnicity, race, language and culture . . .” (2004, p. 272). 
 
Mediascapes 
 
In regard to the globalizing impact of Western media, the example I know best comes 
from Indonesia.  In the early 1990s, the U.S. required Indonesia to import American films and 
television shows in order to continue to export textiles to the U.S. This policy stymied the 
Indonesian film industry.  The number of Indonesian films was reduced from more than ninety 
per year to less that twenty-five per year, and most of those films were imitations of the 
American sex comedy (Barber, 1995, p. 91). This requirement also raised concerns about the 
American movie industry’s purported intention of destroying Islam and corrupting the values of 
Islamic societies such as Indonesia. Many Indonesians were concerned with the portrayal of 
scantily clad women (having bare shoulders and knees). Such concerns persist even though 
Appadurai asserts, “The United States is no longer the puppeteer of a world system of images 
but is only one node of a complex transnational construction of imaginary landscapes” (1996, p. 
31). The Indonesian film industry has since recovered and now produces a wide range of films.  
Among these are horror films, historical adventures, and a new meta-genre: the Islamic film. I 
call this a meta-genre because Islamic films can be romances, historical adventures, or any 
other sort of film. Islamic themes even show up in sex comedies  such as the Kawin Kontrak 
franchise, which deals with the idea of short term, or muta’ marriages.  
Another Islamic film, Mengaku Raul Sesat,
5 deals with the issue of false prophets at a 
time when Indonesian society was embroiled in debates about Ahmadiyya, a transnational 
religious movement which self-identifies as a sect of Islam. The plot of Mengaku Rasul: Sesat 
is simple enough: girl catches guy with another girl and runs off to join an unusual boarding 
school, becomes drawn into a radical and errant sect of Muslims and becomes the love interest 
of the guru, is chased by the boy and eventually marries and murders the guru. Key features of 
the story include apparent miracles, claims to be a new prophet, and ultimately the revelation 
that the guru is in fact a pair of corrupt, manipulative, and violent con men. The film was 
released during the height of debates about the status of the Ahmadiyya community. While not 
directly addressing the issue of Ahmadiyya, the film seeks to establish attitudes toward the very 
idea of recently proclaimed prophets, and in so doing represents a local response to one aspect 
of Islamic global ethnoscapes.   
  Films and television programs, often in the form of bootleg DVDs from other Muslim 
countries, are also popular. For example, the hilarious Upin and Ipin Ramadan Specials which 
follow a group of Malaysian village pre-schoolers as the title characters experience their first 
(and later, their second) Ramadan in which they keep the complete fast. The main point of the 
two sets of specials (from consecutive years) is to teach children about Ramadan. This is a 
common feature of these “imports”—that Islamic values are taught.  However, Upin and Ipin 
also highlight dimensions of Malay customs that make sense to Indonesian but not to Pakistanis 
or Saudis. The cartoon was created in the context of globalization; it shows the Muslim boys’ 
friendship with an Indian boy and a Chinese girl, who represent different ethnoscapes. Once 
created, the movie itself was globalized.  Beyond being a popular bootleg in Indonesia, it is part 
of the Disney Channel Asia line-up. 
There are obviously many other dimensions of Muslim mediascapes that limitations of 
time and space do not me to explore at this time. These include print Islam, cassette recorded Journal of International and Global Studies 
43 
 
sermons, television preachers, as well as religious DVDs and DVD designed to create sympathy 
for Muslim brothers who are facing the battlefield, like Batupun Berteriak (Even the Stones Cry 
Out) about the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the Baghdad Sniper series, which are only 
one of a whole “genre” of documentaries meant to show the atrocities of the US occupation of 
Iraq. 
 
Conclusion 
 
  By applying Appadurai's five landscapes of globalization to Muslims, this paper has 
demonstrated some of the ways in which Muslim globalization works. Muslim globalization 
began the moment Islam spread to non-Arabs. As a missionizing religion, Islam not only sees 
itself as relevant to all humans, it ties together people from all over the world who may come 
from what are otherwise very diverse cultures. Historically, the missionary activities of Islam 
were inseparable from trade and statecraft. Whether by conquest or treaty, there was a 
transnational economic system dominated by Muslims that spread across most of the Old 
World. Once this system was established throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, Muslim 
globalization occurred through interconnections between local communities (through the 
movement of scholars and pilgrims), a process which itself shows the extent to which Muslim 
ethnoscapes, financescapes, and ideoscapes are interrelated. The movement of media, whether 
it be books, cassettes, or movies, is also part of Muslim globalization. Sometimes media is 
created in response to globalization and then is itself globalized.    
This paper itself is in fact the product of Muslim processes of globalization. It was 
presented at the 2009 conference “The Implementation of Qur’anic Values and the Challenges 
of Globalization,” sponsored by the Center for the Study of Contemporary Indonesian Islam 
and Society, in Jambi, Indonesia. The organizers wanted an international conference, and so 
they invited a Syrian scholar and me. The prestige of running a truly international conference 
was important to the organizers and the attendees (even to the extent that inviting an American 
scholar living in Indonesia to attend the conference was not good enough; they wanted to fly 
“international scholars” in directly from the United States). In contrast to the idea that Muslims 
are somehow afraid of globalization, the desire for an international conference shows a desire to 
actively engage the very globalizing that Muslims are said to resist. This paper has argued that 
instead of thinking of Islam as opposed to globalization, it must be conceived of as part of it.    
However, Muslim globalization represents a very different dimension of globalization than that 
which is typically represented by global capitalism and efforts to spread Jeffersonian 
democracy.    Islamization as Part of Globalization: Some Southeast Asian Examples 
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1 The anthropological usage of the term “myth” simply means “sacred story.” 
2 Abdurrahman Wahid was a popular ulama, the former head of Nahdatul Ulama, and the fourth President of 
Indonesia.  His family graveyard has long been a pilgrimage site, but with his burial there, the monthly average 
number of pilgrims rose from 2000 to 5000. 
3 Ironically, this conflation of Islam and Arab does pick up on the globalizing attempts of the Saudi-based Wahhabi 
movement.  Neo-fundamentalist Muslims argue for the globalization of “Arab” style dress and customs in favor of 
local interpretations of Islam.  Even if fundamentalists do not argue for the imitation of contemporary Arabs, at the 
very least they argue for the imitation of imagined 7th century Arabs. 
4 This is not to deny the spiritual dimension of conversion, but simply to highlight the fact that these conversions 
created a network of kingdoms stretching over a large portion of the world. 
5 I am indebted to Sharon W. Davis for her assistance with the summary and analysis of this film. 
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